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The Missing Human in Human Rights Law: A gendered perspective 
of torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, or 
punishment with specific emphasis on restriction of reproductive 
justice and gender-based violence 
Anamika Misra 
Abstract 
This article examines the meaning and potential merits of interpreting norms of 
torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, or punishment (CIDTP) 
through a ‘gender perspective’. It will place particular emphasis on understanding the 
denial of reproductive rights and gender-based violence as torture and CIDTP. I 
engage in a critical feminist study of the doctrinal aspects of the international human 
rights law on torture by analysing the legal practice of regional human rights courts 
and the UN Human Rights Committee by evaluating their case law and other legal 
mechanisms arising from these systems. In addition to these primary sources I also 
refer to secondary sources such as reports by UN Special Rapporteurs, studies by 
civil society organisations specialising in reproductive rights, and academic writing in 
this field. I advocate the integration of a feminist and intersectional framework through 
which to analyse the creation and implementation of human rights legislation, thereby 
improving the resilience and effectiveness of protections and redress provided by 
these rights. This will further incorporate gender into the mainstream practice of 
international human rights law and will strengthen the protection of those who are 
victimised and disempowered.  




Women, transgender and non-binary people across the world have endured 
continuous backlash against their reproductive and sexual rights through the 
regulation and restriction of their access to abortions, contraception and other family 
planning needs. States’ failures to eradicate sexual violence, female genital mutilation 
(FGM), forced sterilisations and other violations of sexual and reproductive health are 
serious human rights violations that result in tremendous physical and psychological 
pain. However, the experiences of women, transgender and non-binary persons are 
rendered invisible by the androcentric nature of most international legislation. This is 
best illustrated in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), which fails to emphasise 
the gendered nature of torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment (CIDTP) and the multiple ways non-men experience such situations in 
their daily lives. 
My objective is to reinterpret the androcentric understanding of torture and 
CIDTP in order to re-examine the violations imposed on women, transgender and non-
binary persons and their bodies in that as torture and CIDTP and to reinforce the 
urgency of addressing the issues at hand. Violations of reproductive rights lead to the 
further degradation of other human rights protections and affect more than just half of 
the human population. By fully incorporating a gendered perspective to the 
understanding of torture and CIDTP we can place obligations on states to prevent, 
punish and redress such instances faced by non-men with the same urgency as other 
instances of the same violations.  
My analysis will commence by setting out the current state of the international 
law on torture and the relevant international and regional treaties governing the norms 
and enumerate the pre-existing instances of gender-mainstreaming. I will then explain 
the theoretical foundations of a gendered perspective and ‘intersectionality’ by briefly 
outlining the key concepts underpinning this framework. From there, I will launch into 
my central thesis of reframing the current understanding of torture and the associated 
international law beyond its androcentric underpinnings. Lastly, I will conclude on how 
an intersectional law on torture could offer us a world free of torture and CIDTP for all. 
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I will be relying on academic literature, documents from civil society 
organisations, reports from various UN and regional organisations and cases from 
regional human rights courts to reinterpret the denial of reproductive rights and 
gender-based violence as torture and CIDTP. In understanding these violations it is 
necessary to understand the importance of intersectionality, an analytical framework 
that attempts to identify the marginalising impact of various interlocking systems of 
power and privilege on individuals within society1. These violations are multifaceted 
and so are the experiences; often dictated by specific vulnerabilities related to age, 
socio-economic class, physical and mental health, immigration status and race 
amongst other factors. 
The International Law on Torture and State Obligations- 
There is a wide range of international and regional legal instruments that 
prohibit torture such as the Convention against Torture (UNCAT) and Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2, as mentioned above. 
Regional human rights treaties such as the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR), the European Convention on Human Rights (EConHR) and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Banjul Charter) also prohibit torture and 
enshrine the right to life. Torture is also prohibited under international criminal law and 
international humanitarian law. The prohibition against torture and CIDTP has also 
attained customary international legal status and is a jus cogens norm of international 
law, entailing that states cannot derogate from it.3 
Article 1 of UNCAT provides us with the definition of what constitutes torture by 
setting out the four elements required to meet the threshold – severe pain and 
suffering, intent, purpose and state involvement. In 2008, the Special Rapporteur on 
torture and CIDTP also proposed the addition of the ‘element of powerlessness’ to the 
above criteria.4 Powerlessness has been described as a situation ‘where one person 
 
1 Brittney Cooper, ‘Intersectionality’ in Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth (eds), Oxford Handbook of 
Feminist Theory (Oxford University Press 2016), 1 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. Article 7 states “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
3 UNGA ‘Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session’ (2014) UN Doc A/69/10 
4 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/3, para 28 
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exercises total power over another’. This manifests in classic detention situations such 
as in prisons, asylum and refugee detention centres and even in hospitals where 
women are detained due to their inability to cover the costs of their medical treatment.5 
Intensity is central to the distinction between torture and CIDTP and while no 
definitional thresholds have been set by the CAT committee, regional courts have 
carefully delineated the legal standards that distinguish torture from CIDTP. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its Ireland6 judgement held that ‘the 
distinction between torture and inhuman treatment derives principally from a difference 
in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.’7  In subsequent judgments on the issue of 
torture the court has upheld the Ireland ruling and noted that its intent was to attach a 
special stigma to torture which causes serious and cruel suffering.8 
Under international law, states have both positive and negative obligations with 
regards to torture and CIDTP, they have to refrain from committing acts of torture and 
also prevent, punish and provide redress for any violations. Positive obligations can 
be understood widely and could include provision of knowledge and training to law 
enforcement and detention personnel, or, as proposed in the Maputo Protocol on the 
Rights of Women in Africa-  
It could require states ‘to discourage customary, cultural and religious practices 
which are inconsistent and violate the Banjul Charter and urge them to eliminate 
traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which help legitimise the 
gender-based violence and help it sustain and continue to exacerbate’9.  
States are under international and regional obligations to ensure state agents, 
private individuals and others acting on behalf of the state or in relation to it comply 
with human rights law. As such, the state bears the onus of creating effective 
measures to curb violations against the freedom from torture and CIDTP to be 
committed, instigated, incited, or encouraged by public authorities and other persons 
 
5 Centre for Reproductive Rights ‘Briefing Paper- Reproductive Rights Violations as Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, or Punishment: A Critical Human Rights Analysis’ (2010), 
18 
6 Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25 
7 Ibid, para 167 
8 Selmouni v France (1999) 29 EHRR 403, para 96 
9 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(Maputo Protocol) 2003, Articles 4 (The Rights to Life, Integrity and Security of the Person) and 5 
(Elimination of Harmful Practices). 
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acting in an official capacity. If such a violation has occurred, the state is required to 
provide suitable mechanisms of investigation and redress to rectify the violation.10 
The responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated by non-state actors 
also lies on states if they have failed to take reasonable measures to prevent harm to 
individuals and their human rights or if due diligence has not been exercised in 
securing equal access to human rights for all. State responsibility for non-state actors 
is vital to the eradication of violations that occur in the private sphere, most of which 
are gendered violations (such as marital rape and domestic violence) or violations that 
impact women disproportionately (female domestic workers face a higher degree of 
abuse than their male counterparts),11 it is also vital to keep in check private actors 
such as private healthcare establishments, detention facilities and corporations which 
are often sites of CIDTP and torture. 
In Gonzales et al,12 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
elaborated further on the responsibility of states to address gender-based violence 
perpetrated by non-state actors. The Court held that Mexico had defaulted on its 
obligation to ensure due diligence in investigating numerous murders and was found 
to have violated its general obligation to guarantee the rights enshrined in Articles 4, 
5 and 7 of the American Charter of Human Rights (ACHR).13 However, it was not found 
to be internationally responsible for these violations, nor directly complicit in the 
commission of torture.14 Nonetheless, the court recognised the effect of a culture of 
gender-based discrimination on the violence that was perpetuated and even on the 
inaction of the state to investigate and prosecute.15  
In addition to the above case, the CAT Committee in its General Comment 2 
(2008) has made it explicit that if State authorities or those acting in an official capacity 
have knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that non-state officials or private 
 
10 UN Committee Against Torture ‘General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States 
Parties’ (24 January 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 
11 Human Rights Watch ‘I Already Bought You: Abuse and Exploitation of Female Migrant Domestic 
Workers in the United Arab Emirates’ (2014), 32-33 
12 Case of Gonzales et al. v Mexico (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (November 16 2009) 
13 Ibid, 146 para 4 
14 Concurring Opinion of Judge Cecilia Medina in the Case of Gonzales et al. v Mexico (November 16 
2009), para 1. The Judge, despite agreeing with most of the judgement, believes that Mexico violated 
A 5(2) of the ACHR.  
15Human Rights Watch (n 11), para 164 
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actors are committing acts of torture and ill-treatment and fail to prevent, investigate, 
prosecute and punish those responsible according to CAT, then the State is complicit 
in the commission of such violations.16 Failure of the state to intervene and offer 
redress for torture emboldens non-state actors to continue committing acts which are 
prohibited under CAT with impunity. In fact, state inaction and indifference even 
encourages further torture and CIDTP.17 This principle has been found to be 
particularly applicable in instances of states’ failure to prevent and protect victims from 
gender-based violence by the Committee.18 
The Need to Adopt an Intersectional and Gendered Framework 
This paper comes at a time when there is increasing attention towards sexual 
violence and denial of reproductive rights. At a global level, gender-sensitive policies19 
are gaining prominence in the highest levels of policy making.  
With the repeal of the Eighth Amendment of the Irish Constitution, the #MeToo 
movement against sexual violence in the workplace and an increased visibility of 
feminist thinking and movements; significant gains have been made against the 
marginalisation of non-male persons. Yet, attempts to police reproductive rights and 
reminders of sexual and gender-based violence are ever-present. Institutionalised 
attempts to marginalise the rights of women and non-binary persons continue to 
adversely impact development and implementation of domestic and international law 
and policy. 
The importance of a gendered framework is one that is both practical and 
theoretical. An absence of gendered analysis usually results in the erasure of the 
experiences of women, LGBTI+ and non-binary persons. Their identities are often 
reduced to caricatures, obfuscating their complicated realities and preventing a holistic 
understanding of the problems that they face. This reduction enables the creation of 
 
16 n 10, para 18 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 For instance, Goal 5 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals is ‘Gender Equality’: 
‘Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ (United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals) < https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/> Accessed 29th 
May 2019; See also: ‘Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 2018) 
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/gender-responsive-un-peacekeeping-operations-
policy-en.pdf> Accessed 29th May 2019 
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exclusionary policies that perpetuate violence, deny agency and dehumanise women, 
non-binary and LGBTI+ persons.20 
Cognisance of particular norms related to gender-based discrimination and 
adequate application of a gendered-framework to analysing these norms can 
illuminate critical human rights violations and abuses of international law. For instance, 
an absence of knowledge regarding the applicable standards for the detention of 
victims of sexual violence can result in disregard of specific obligations that public and 
private agents bear under international law.21  
Moreover, integrating a gender-centric analysis can help to recognise the 
specific impact that certain human rights situations or crises have on different 
individuals and populations. It can assist in tailoring humanitarian responses to provide 
appropriate relief, bettering the recommendations arising out of international reports 
and improving the implementation of human rights and other extra-legal measures.22  
In fact, a gendered perspective – especially in a field such as human rights – 
can encourage us to recognise that  rights for non-men need not compete with those 
for men. In situations of sexual violence, where stigma still exists regarding the 
violence suffered by men, a perspective which is ‘gender-equal’23 would recognise the 
nuances of gender and gender-based violence. Ultimately, the goal is universally 
beneficial: creating protections against sexual violence suffered by women and 
LGBTI+ people can be broadened to include the experiences of male victims.24  
But in order to devise a gendered and intersectional framework it is imperative 
to understand the meaning(s) of gender and intersectionality despite their widespread 
use; especially today where they have come to have different meanings depending on 
the communities they are being used by. 
Gender is a social construction that is constantly evolving with the changing 
perceptions of society and intentional manipulation.25 Feminists have contended that 
 
20 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights ‘Integrating A Gender Perspective 
Into Human Rights Investigations: Guidance and Practice’ (United Nations 2018), 10 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
23 Pamela Scully, ‘Vulnerable Women: A critical reflection on human rights discourse and sexual 
violence’, (2009) 23 Emory International Law Review 100, 113. 
24 Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne ‘The dialogue of difference: gender perspectives on international 
humanitarian law’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 22, 49 
25 Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores (Zed Books 2007) 5 
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the socially constructed division between ‘men’ and ‘non-men’ is unnatural in that it 
materialises in power disparities constructed along gendered lines.26  
Commonly used, the term ‘sex’ is associated with the biological differences of 
persons whereas ‘gender’ is the socially-constructed difference amongst these 
persons. While the distinction between what the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ mean is easy 
to understand, it is debatable to what extent can either be extricated from the other 
and how much the biology affects the manifestation of the social and vice-versa. For 
instance, Judith Butler considers the biology and the social to be interdependent 
constructions.27  
Sex and gender categories, regardless of origin tend to be divided along the 
lines of ‘masculinities’ and ‘femininities’ (or non-masculinities) based on stereotypes, 
expected behaviour and ‘rules’ that members from these separate and dichotomous 
groups are expected to adhere to. The creation of these supposedly irreconcilable 
dichotomies also creates a presumed binary in experiences of power and 
subordination that overlooks the fluid nature of gender-based violence. This social 
classification and treatment based on a perceived gender is called ‘gendering’; it is not 
always consistent and specific but based on assumptions, not about the individual’s 
characteristics but that of the perceived group.28 
Even though gender is a social construct, it should not be believed that gender 
and gendered oppression are somehow less real due to being an abstract concept. 
Imperatively, social constructions such as gender help to construct social life itself. As 
such, gender becomes a lived reality and so does the resultant gendering and 
subordination – cutting across temporal, spatial and cultural elements.29 It would be 
misleading to characterise the ‘gendered experience’ as a uniform occurrence that is 
shared by all people perceived as male, female, or LGBTI+.  
Recognition of this heterogeneous experience of gender is made possible by 
the analytical framework of intersectionality, which emerged in the late 1980s as a way 
to attend to the distinct position of black women and other women of colour, both within 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge 1990) 
28 ibid 
29 n 24, 6 
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the application of civil rights law and civil rights movements.30 The theory was devised 
by Kimberlé Crenshaw who further elaborated on the methodology and concerns of 
intersectionality.31 The term developed into a framework that disrupted the tendency 
of civil rights discourse to treat race and gender as detached attributes of lived 
experiences and violations.32 Crenshaw asserted that black women existed at an 
‘intersection’ of race and gender, thus suffering both sets of prejudices simultaneously.  
Through its translation into the discourse of human rights and the particular 
issue of gender-based violence, intersectionality helps us not only to understand why 
a particular individual, for example an economically-marginalised woman of colour, 
might suffer the violation of her rights but also provides us with a more nuanced lens 
through which to suggest measures that cater to her specific needs.  
Due to the economic and social differences that intersect with separate gender 
identities, the consequences of policies often vary along gendered lines. These 
differences are further compounded by factors such as race, class and sexuality. As 
a result, an intersectional analysis of policy and law is necessary to unravel the 
nuances behind individual experiences and violations and ultimately evaluate 
compliance.  
Keeping in mind the need for a gendered and intersectional perspective, I will 
now evaluate the five key elements of torture and CIDTP (as mentioned in section 
one) through this lens. 
Key Elements of Torture and CIDTP through a Gendered Perspective 
As has been demonstrated above, preventing, punishing and protecting victims 
from torture and CIDTP is an indivisible norm of international law and compels states 
to put in place effective measures, especially those which protect minority and 
marginalised communities. Effective prevention depends on a well-founded 
understanding of the varied factors that determine victimisation and the sites they can 
 
30 n 1,3 
31 Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color’ [1991] 43 Stanford Law Review 1241, 1250 
32 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Intersectionality and the feminist project in law’ in Emily Grabham et al (eds), 
Intersectionality and Beyond (Routledge 2009) 23 
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occur in. What follows is an analysis of the elements of torture and CIDTP from a 
gendered perspective. 
Intent and Purpose 
The intent and purpose elements of torture and CIDTP are closely interlinked 
and can often be inferred from one another. A person could be said to possess the 
intent to engage in a particular action and engage in the results of that action if they 
act with the requisite purpose. In the context of women’s reproductive rights this is 
especially pertinent as violations are often a result of gender-based discrimination and 
patriarchal mentality with regards to gender roles in society. In his report as Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and CIDTP, Manfred Nowak held that in instances of gender-
based violence ‘the purpose element is always fulfilled’33 if it can be demonstrated that 
the acts are gender-specific as discrimination is one of the criteria present in the CAT 
definition.  
Additionally, if the act has a specific purpose the intent can be implied.34 This 
is significant in understanding the discriminatory nature of legal and policy restrictions 
on access to reproductive justice,35 the denial of which perpetuates toxic stereotypes 
about childbirth being a woman’s sole duty. This carries the connotation that women 
lack the personal intellectual agency to make decisions concerning their sexuality and 
reproduction. Those who draft, pass and support such laws and policies do it with full 
knowledge of the detrimental effect the policies will have on the lives of women and 
non-cisgendered persons. These policies (and the lawmakers behind them) not only 
endanger the right to privacy and family life but also intentionally or negligently inflict 
harm on them.  
Moreover, by stigmatising access to reproductive health, legislators cause a 
chilling effect whereby those in desperate need of those services are either unable to 
access them in the first place or find themselves stigmatised and denied follow-up 
care. Discriminatory laws can also render healthcare professionals complicit in human 
 
33 n 3, para 30 
34 Ibid. 
35 The concept was developed by women of colour as an alternative paradigm to the individualised 
discourse of ‘reproductive rights’: Kimala Price, ‘What is Reproductive Justice?: How Women of Color 
Activists Are Redefining the Pro-Choice Paradigm’ (2010) 10 Meridians 42; see also: L. Ross and R. 
Solinger, Reproductive Justice: An Introduction (University of California Press 2017); F.Bloomer et al, 
Reimagining global abortion politics: A social justice perspective (Bristol University Press 2019) 
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rights violations, even where the professional might not have the requisite intent. By 
placing serious punishments on the provision of safe abortion services for example, 
healthcare providers might be forced to deny medically-necessary treatment and 
favour the interests of the state to the detriment of their patient’s health and 
wellbeing.36 
Severity of Harm and Suffering 
No specific and clear criteria have been established to measure the level of 
suffering and harm that constitutes torture and CIDTP, but international and regional 
bodies rely on both objective criteria (such as duration, manner and execution of the 
torture) and subjective factors (such as age, gender and social status) to quantify the 
intensity of the alleged act. The assessment of the severity of harm and suffering is 
highly dependent on subjective factors as these may influence the objective factors. 
For instance, the sexual violence inflicted upon Yazidi women by ISIS resulted from 
the convergence of their religious identity and gender; these factors led them to be 
subjected to sexual slavery and other gender-based violence.37  
In Miguel-Castro Prison,38 the IACtHR gave a judgement that was cognisant of 
the gendered nature of CIDT. The Court held that subjecting women (some of whom 
were pregnant) to forced strip searches, nudity, physical and psychological abuse 
while denying them medical treatment amounted to sexual violence and violated their 
right to humane treatment (Article 5 ACHR).39 It announced that these acts caused the 
women ‘serious psychological and moral suffering’.40 Accordingly, it was held that Peru 
had failed in its obligations under the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Article 7(b))41 by failing to 
prevent this violence and punish those responsible.  
State Involvement  
Due to the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture and CIDTP, states 
have an obligation to prevent, punish and redress instances of torture and CIDTP 
 
36 n 4, 11 
37 UN Human Rights Council ‘They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’ (15th June 
2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
38 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter American Court of Human Rights (Nov. 25, 2006) 
39 Ibid, 166 para 4-5 
40 Ibid, para 308 
41 Ibid. 166, para 6 
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committed by agents of the state, those in official capacity, or non-state actors who 
commit such acts due to the lack of due diligence by the state. 
In General Comment 35,42 the Committee for the Convention for the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) noted that the acts or 
omissions of private agents that exercise elements of government authority and 
provide public services will be attributable to the state.43 It also notes that states have 
an obligation of due diligence when ensuring that corporations under their influence – 
either by regulation or by the use of incentives – don’t commit human rights violations 
or perpetuate gender-based violence.44 
The General Comment reiterates that culture and social practices are the major 
obstacles to combating gender-based violence, but also cites factors which are 
consciously implemented by states such as austerity measures, reduction of public 
and international funding and policies governing corporations. In so doing, it 
recognises that external forces underpin the exacerbation of gender-based violence, 
especially in the Global South and implicitly places blame on the Global North.45 
Another aspect of state responsibility has been that of the state over a devolved 
constituent unit within its territory. This is embodied in CEDAW’s report on the UK and 
its failure to protect women in Northern Ireland from human rights violations due to 
restrictive abortion laws.46 In the report, CEDAW vice-chair Ruth Halperin-Kaddari said 
that ‘the situation in Northern Ireland constitutes gender-based violence that may 
amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’47 and held that it is the 
responsibility of the UK government to ensure that all laws within its territory, including 
those of devolved constituent units are in line with the state’s international 
 
42 UN Commission on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘General recommendation No. 
35 on gender-based gender-based violence, updating general recommendation No. 19’ (14 July 
2017) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35 
43 Ibid, para 14 
44 Ibid, para 24(b) 
45 Christine Chinkin ‘CEDAW General Recommendation 35 on gender-based violence is a significant 
step forward’ (London School of Economics Centre for Women, Peace, and Security, 6 September 
2017) < http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/09/06/cedaw-general-recommendation-35-on-violence-
against-women-is-a-significant-step-forward/> Accessed 25th April 2018 
46 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ‘Report of the inquiry 
concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (23 
February 2018) UN Doc CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 
47 Ibid, para 65 
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obligations.48 This recognition was monumental in not only recognising the 
discriminatory access to reproductive assistance in Northern Ireland as CIDTP, but 
also reprimanded the UK for shirking the burden and placing it rightfully on its 
shoulders. Moreover, reinterpreting denial of reproductive rights as torture and CIDTP, 
rightly demonstrates the gravity of the violence experienced.  
Powerlessness 
In his second report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and CIDTP proposed the inclusion of the criterion of ‘powerlessness’ in the 
definition of torture and CIDTP. ‘Powerlessness’ can arise in scenarios involving 
detention and demonstrative contexts where a person is unable to resist the use of 
force anymore, either due to coercion or use of restraints. ‘If such coercion results in 
severe pain or suffering inflicted to achieve a certain purpose, it must even be 
considered as torture’,49 commented the Special Rapporteur.  
This element has been applied to gender-specific harms such as rape, 
domestic violence and FGM all of which are facilitated by rendering the victim 
powerless, either physically, monetarily, or societally (through risk of ostracisation). In 
the case of domestic violence, powerlessness is a pervasive factor, often manifesting 
through various means such as restriction of financial resources, erosion of 
psychological will and strength, coercive control through reward and punishment – and 
even societal pressures and taboos surrounding divorce – may have the cumulative 
effect of forcing the victim to bear the violence without fleeing. Similarly, FGM is 
facilitated by a fear of social ostracization, from their parents and the wider community, 
rendering young victims powerless. 
The element of powerlessness is integral to a gendered understanding of 
torture and CIDTP as it accommodates the specific attributes of the victim such as 
sex, age, religion, sexuality and health which could render an individual powerless in 
any instance.50 Moreover, according to the Special Rapporteur, societal, institutional 
and legislative indifference towards the inferior status of women and non-cisgendered 
 
48 Ibid para 53 
49 UN Commission of Human Rights ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question 
of torture, Manfred Nowak ‘ (23 December 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/6, para 40 
50 n.3, para 29 
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persons creates conditions for powerlessness and subjects them to violations despite 
the so-called ‘freedom to resist’.51 
Notably, the above considerations on powerlessness align with the approach 
taken by the ECtHR and IACtHR, who are mindful of the various circumstances that 
could lead to torture and CIDTP and how those circumstances also affect the severity 
of the individual’s experience of suffering and harm.52 
This gendered understanding of the elements of torture and CIDTP helps to 
contextualise the various violations women experience in terms that reflect their 
gravity. It is important that violations against women are noted to be more than just 
violations of their private life and health and are seen as torturous and cruel and 
impinging on their right to life and bodily integrity.  
Reforming the Androcentricity of Torture and CIDTP 
The classic image of torture is that of a man, hooded or subjected to stress 
positions, likely half naked and, post 9/11, a person of colour. It is rare that we visualise 
victims of domestic violence or pregnant persons who have been shackled during 
childbirth, denied access to reproductive health services and forced to continue an 
unwanted or unviable pregnancy to term. The private/public distinction ingrained in the 
formulation of international human rights law and especially civil and political rights 
does a disservice to people of marginalised gender identities, who experience torture 
and CIDTP in the private ‘non-governmental’ sphere rather than in the public sense 
that international human rights law targets. 
In her second report as Special Rapporteur of Gender-based violence (the first 
Special Rapporteur to hold a gender-specific mandate),53 Radhika Coomaraswamy 
drew parallels between the experiences of a victim of torture and those of a victim of 
domestic violence. She identified that in both cases with victims suffer physical and/or 
psychological violence (or, in some cases, death) at the hands of actors who 
intentionally and purposefully (often intending to punish) exercise coercive control over 
 
51 Ibid. 
52 Notable in cited cases from these regional systems. 
53 Hillary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin ‘The Boundaries of International Law’ (Manchester 
University Press, 2000) 219 
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their victims. This can be as a result of tacit state involvement where the state defaults 
on its obligation to ensure equal protection in preventing domestic violence.54 
Experts and jurists have established that both ‘the battered woman’ and ‘the 
prisoner’ live in constant fear of pain and suffering, suffer debilitating physical and 
mental violence and are rendered powerless to escape either by force or fear of the 
consequences. In the same report, Coomaraswamy upheld that the IHRL framework 
could help to address discriminatory laws and customs that allow the perpetuation of 
gender-based violence in the private sphere.55 
Other instances that could constitute torture and CIDTP by private actors 
include rape, FGM, forced abortions/pregnancies/sterilisation (as a result of familial or 
societal norms that prefer a male child or practices carried out by private healthcare 
providers), sexual slavery and honour-based crimes. These violations are widespread 
and affect millions of women and marginalised persons every year across the world, 
but due to androcentric understandings of torture they have become trivialised and 
their prevention, investigation and punishment is not given enough attention by state 
authorities. When they are construed to be of state-level importance, they are pigeon-
holed into categories of ‘traditional practices’ or ‘crimes against modesty’, neither of 
which carry the stigma and urgency of torture and CIDTP.  
The erasure of such crimes is not solely dependent on strong laws criminalising 
them, but also the enforcement of such laws. The latter is complicated by the 
normalisation of gender-based violence and state unwillingness to tackle the private 
sphere and cultural practices. This complexity is particularly apparent where cultural 
and social justifications have been used to defend FGM, in spite of its severe physical 
and psychological effects, lasting far beyond the procedure itself and affecting the 
sexuality and reproductive ability of victims. It can lead to severe bleeding, neurogenic 
shock due to pain, infection, septicaemia, fear of sex and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.56  
 
54 UN Commission on Human Rights 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Gender-based violence, its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy’ (5 February 1996) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1996/53, para 44 
55 Ibid para 45 
56 n 3, para 50 
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The Human Rights Commission (HRC) has recognised FGM as a violation of 
the right to be free from torture under article 7 of the ICCPR,57 the CAT Committee 
has recognised that the practice amounts to CIDTP under Article 16 of UNCAT and 
lastly the Special Rapporteur on Torture has upheld that FGM might constitute torture, 
regardless of its legality. Additionally, the medicalisation of the procedure still renders 
the practice unacceptable. In fact, failure to investigate and punish medical 
practitioners who carry out FGM amounts de facto consent by the state, leaving it 
accountable for the human rights violations resulting from the practice.58 
Accounting for torture and CIDTP that victimises women in the public sphere 
requires us to recognise the various sites where such violations can occur. Even a 
gendered understanding of torture it is limited to sexual violence, usually rape, 
occurring in circumstances of armed conflict and police or military custody. But while 
these examples are important, they do not define the majority of experiences that 
women have faced. Sexual violence takes place in hospitals, asylum detention 
centres, educational settings and prisons or other detention facilities.  
The case of M.M.59 illustrates the gendered experience of torture and CIDTP 
within a healthcare setting specifically. M.M. was drugged and raped by the doctor she 
was seeking treatment from. The rape resulted in vaginal haemorrhage that lasted for 
several days while she was denied medical help. M.M was humiliated by the nurses 
she confided in and was subsequently misdiagnosed as menstruating, not 
haemorrhaging.60 M.M. was prescribed medication that she could not afford, and was 
thus forced to go from one pharmacy to another – crying and haemorrhaging – until 
she reached a pharmacy that would provide free medication.61  
The situation she had faced was inhumane, degrading and subjected her to 
severe levels of anguish, both mental and physical. The doctor that had raped her was 
acquitted by the criminal court and it was only with the assistance of non-governmental 
organisations that the victim was able to put a petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). This resulted in a friendly settlement that 
 
57 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General comment No. 28 on article 3- The equality of 
rights between men and women’ (2000), para 11 
58 n 3, para 53 
59 M.M. v Peru (Report on Friendly Settlement) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.151 Doc. 34 (25 July 2014) 
60 Ibid, para 17 
61 Ibid, para 18 
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demanded corrective actions from Peru to address the violations against M.M. and to 
prevent similar incidents from happening again. 
Healthcare providers often have the tacit ability to impact patient autonomy 
when it comes to making decision regarding their healthcare. As patients become 
powerless in some situations, especially if they are already particularly vulnerable due 
to their mental or physical health, socio-economic status, immigration status and past 
victimisation. Powerlessness is only exacerbated in the context of stigmatised services 
such as reproductive health services. Access to these medically necessary services 
is often impeded by restrictive laws and policies or decisions made by practitioners 
due to their personal objections, both of which are affected by gender stereotypes. 
Restrictions and complete denial of access to abortions can often lead to 
already-vulnerable women suffering cruel and degrading treatment. This has been 
exemplified in a wide variety of cases across the world. K.L.62 was one of the first 
cases in which the Human Rights Committee (HRC) ruled that ‘the denial of medically 
necessary abortion put K.L.’s physical and mental health at severe risk and violated 
her fundamental right to be free from CIDTP under article 7 ICCPR’.63 In this case, the 
petitioner was denied abortion upon learning that her foetus had anencephaly – a fatal 
medical condition where either the foetus does not survive to term or dies soon after 
birth – and was forced not only to carry the pregnancy to term but also to breastfeed 
the baby for the four days it was alive. 
In subsequent cases64regional and international systems have upheld 
reproductive rights, especially with regards to access to abortion. They have also 
stated that in certain circumstances (gauged qualitatively on the basis of vulnerability 
or risk to life of pregnant persons) when these rights are violated, the violations amount 
to CIDTP. 
In a recent report, the African Commission on Human Rights (ACHR) 
recognised the serious consequences of such denial on the physical and mental 
 
62 K.L. v. Peru, Communication No. 1153/2003, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005) 
63 Ibid, para 6.3 
64 LMR (2011 Communication No. 1608/2007, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007); R.R. (2011 ECHR 828); P. and S.(2012 ECHR 1853); Mellet (2016 
Communication No. 2324/2013, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013); and 
Whelan (2017 Communication No. 2425/2014, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014).  
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wellbeing of the woman by examining the possible categorisation of denial of post-
abortion treatment as torture and CIDTP.65 Women are delayed or denied from 
seeking post-abortion care due to social stigma or the prohibitive costs of the care. 
Their suffering is made even graver whereupon they are detained for being unable to 
pay for the treatment that they medically require.66 
In cases such as Tysiąc67 and A, B, C68 the ECtHR failed to uphold violations 
of Article 3 and instead classified the denial of access to abortion as a privacy issue. 
In Tysiąc, it upheld that the privacy of the pregnant woman was inextricably linked to 
the developing foetus and that the balancing of the public interest with privacy laws 
must take into account the state’s positive obligations to secure the bodily integrity of 
pregnant women from undue intrusion by public authorities. Conflicting practice must 
be noted, however, as in A, B, C the court struck this balance in the favour of public 
morality in the instances of A and B due to their less grievous circumstances.69 Another 
key principle upheld in all of the above cases has been that in instances where access 
to abortion is legal, it must also be attainable and not subject to discrimination.  
Women and non-cisgendered persons also suffer grave violence which could 
amount to CIDTP in non-traditional custodial settings such as asylum detention 
centres and schools. The practice of shackling women during childbirth is especially 
degrading example of this. Similarly, the abuse of power by school staff leaves lasting 
physical and psychological scars on their young and vulnerable victims. 
Discrimination exacerbates gender-based violence in both public and private 
spheres by disproportionately impacting women and non-cisgendered persons from 
low income and other marginalised strata of society who are unable to access 
resources to provide them with recourse. Additionally, certain government 
programmes disproportionately harm such persons or are even targeted towards 
them.  
 
65 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ‘Thematic Report on the Denial of 
Abortion and Post-Abortion Care as Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’. (2017), para 14 
66 Ibid, para 18 
67 Tysiąc v. Poland [2007] ECHR 219 
68 A, B, and C v. Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR. 13 
69 Stijn Smet ‘A., B. and C. v. Ireland: Abortion and the Margin of Appreciation’ (Strasbourg 
Observers, December 17 2010) < https://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/17/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-
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Coercive sterilisation, which has been held to violate the right to be free from 
torture and CIDTP by the HRC,70 is one such practice that is legitimised as a birth 
control programme specifically aimed at women from poorer communities who already 
struggle with supporting a family. For instance, nearly 4 million women were forcibly 
sterilised in India under government-run programmes between 2013 and 2014.71 
Instead of providing access to free contraception or information about family planning, 
states have often taken it upon themselves to regulate the reproductive lives of some 
of the most vulnerable members of society, disproportionately targeting economic and 
racial minorities.  
Another aspect of discrimination manifests in the inability to access necessary 
medical treatment due to the high costs associated with it. For instance, women in 
Ireland access abortions much later in their pregnancy than women in the UK due to 
having to account for the logistical costs of the travel and accommodation as well as 
the procedure itself. In light of the 8th Amendment referendum in Ireland, various 
stories by those who have travelled to get abortions have come to the forefront on 
social media, full of harrowing details. Many such stories remain unreported. 
Towards an Intersectional Law against Torture 
Reflecting on the international law on torture and CIDTP through a gendered 
and intersectional lens has made it amply clear that the human rights regime often 
discounts the experiences of a significant proportion of the human population and 
distances itself from the experiences of those who suffer discrimination based on 
class, race, income and health.  
As subjects of international human rights law, our enjoyment of freedom is 
linked to the enjoyment of a variety of rights and so the violations we might experience 
extend across various rights regimes. Furthermore, the ability to redress these 
violations would depend on a variety of factors and will often leave those most in need 
of redress and protection vulnerable. This can only be reversed if multi-layered 
approaches are applied to problems arising out of the power imbalances embedded 
in society. 
 
70 n 4, 20 
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It is only possible to combat the constant subordination of women and non-
cisgendered persons in hetero-patriarchal societies by rectifying our systemically 
inferior position by rightfully claiming real economic, social and political power in both 
public and private domains, the current lack of which precipitates into discriminatory 
treatment.72  
Additionally, placing responsibility on the international community to renew its 
commitment to eradicating gender-based violence is vital for women and non-
cisgendered persons to achieve physical self-determination and live a life free of 
inhumanity. By strengthening the measures in the Optional Protocol to CEDAW and 
making the complaints process more robust we can ensure due diligence is done by 
states in safeguarding women’s rights.  
We must also continue efforts to contextualise gender-based violations and 
denial of reproductive justice outside of the sphere of ‘women’s rights’ and in the 
language of ‘human rights’. In so doing we avoid the risk of having our concerns and 
experiences ghettoised as ‘non-mainstream’ and ensure that the violence we suffer is 
treated at par with that of men. 
Nonetheless, we must be aware of the shortcomings of rights discourse and 
recognise that women’s experiences cannot always be translated into narrow, 
legalistic language. While rights discourse might hold emancipatory power, its 
structures and foundations are inherently designed to discriminate against the most 
vulnerable, and must be critiqued and reformed accordingly. The language of rights is 
complicated and evolving, making it a complex instrument at the international level but 
a flexible tool at the regional and local level. Ultimately, rights must not only be 
universally available but also universally accessible. 
Through advocacy, strategic litigation and constant perseverance, to recognise 
the autonomy and capability of those from marginalised genders we can reaffirm that 
reproductive rights are human rights and end the perpetuation of harm resulting from 
patriarchy.  
It is no longer enough to be brave in the face of violence, we want to be free of 
violence.  
 
72 n 37, 229 
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